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Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In enacting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 Congress
declared that it would no longer tolerate discrimination in federallyfunded programs.2 Title VI provides, in part, that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."3 Given the broad range of
programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance,4 it is
not surprising that title VI has become an important weapon in the
fight against discrimination.5
Despite its sweeping language, the scope of title Vi's prohibition
has been hotly debated. "One of the great unsettled questions of
civil rights law"6 is whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent7 to establish a violation of title VI. 8 Plaintiffs have argued that
proof of the discriminatory impact of a federally funded program
I. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d2000d-6 (1976)).
2. See, e.g., 110 CONG. R.Ec. 1520-21 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id at 6543-47 (remarks of Senator Humphrey); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, reprinted in
(1963) U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2400-01 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE JUDICIARY
REPORT].
.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Section 2000d-l provides that§ 2000d's prohibition extends
to any program or activity receiving federal assistance by way of grant, loan, or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty.
4. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CML RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE Pul!LICATION No. 22, HEW
AND TITLE VI 1-4 (1970).
S. The Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether there is a private cause of
action under title VI, but most courts that have considered the issue, including the Supreme
Court, have either assumed or concluded that title VI confers a private cause of action. See,
e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Calv.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978); 438 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane); Montgomery Improvement Assn.
v. United States Dept. of HUD, 645 F.2d 291,295 (5th Cir. 1981); Bossier Parish School Bd. v.
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
6. Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 299 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. A discriminatory intent standard requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted
out of racial animus. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
8. This issue has been the subject of considerable scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Abernathy, Title VI and t/te Constitution: A Regulatory Model far Defining "Discrimination," 70
GEO. LJ. 1 (1981); Benjes, Heubert & O'Brian, The Legality of Minimum Competency Test
Programs Under Tille VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, IS HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 537
(1980); Note, The Prima Facie Case and Remedies in Title VI Hospital Relocation Cases, 65
CORNELL L. REv. 689 (1980); Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner City: Title VI and
Hospital Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 271 (1980); Note, Title VL· The Impact/Intent Debate
Enters the Municipal Services Arena, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124 (1980); Note, NAA Cl' v. Medical Center, Inc. : The Evidentiary Hearing Under Title VI, 24 ST. Loms U. L.J. 579 (1980).
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should suffice to establish a prima facie violation. 9 Since an impact
standard avoids the formidable problem of proving the defendant's
subjective motivations, it is far more appealing to plaintiffs than an
intent standard. 10 The Supreme Court upheld a finding of discrimination based on administrative regulations that incorporated an impact standard in Lau v. Nichols, 11 but language in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 12 suggested that title VI prohibits
only intentional discrimination. Confronted with ambiguous guidance from the Supreme Court, some courts have adopted an intent
standard, 13 while others have opted for an impact test. 14
This Note analyzes the controversy and concludes that courts
must apply an impact standard in title VI cases. After reviewing the
relevant Supreme Court decisions, Part I contends that Bakke did
not overrule Lau's approval of an impact standard. Part II examines
the regulations on which the Lau court relied. It first characterizes
them as legislative; they derive the force oflaw from an explicit congressional delegation of substantive power. Part II then tests the regulations' impact standard against the language, legislative history,
and policy of title VI and finds it valid. Since courts may not disregard valid legislative regulations, this Note concludes that an impact
standard governs title VI litigation.
9. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane). A
disparate impact standard is satisfied by a showing that the challenged action, even if facially
neutral, falls more harshly on a protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971).
10. The Supreme Court has indicated that discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the impact of a challenged action. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race
than another."); 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Frequently the most probative
evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of
governmental action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation."). This, of course, narrows the practical diJference between
the intent and impact standards.
II. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 981 (1981) (court's holding that plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent in suit
brought under title IX based on analysis of title VI); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th
Cir. 1981); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (no. 81-431); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d
Cir. 1980); Parent Assn. of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1979); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1979).
14. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane);
Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978);
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979), ajfd on other grounds, 620 F.2d 680
(8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978). Only the
NAACP opinion fully confronts the Bakke decision.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S .AMBIGUOUS GUIDANCE
In Lau v. Nichols, 15 the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that
the San Francisco school system's failure to provide supplemental
education to Chinese-speaking children constituted discrimination in
violation of title VI. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on
regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) pursuant to title VI. 16 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas emphasized that HEW's regulations ''barred [discrimination] which has that effect even though no purposeful design is
present." 17 Those regulations, moreover, required that school systems take "affirmative steps" to rectify language deficiencies that
"exclude national origin-minority group children from effective particip~tion in the educational program." 18 Noting that "[t]he Federal
Government has power to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed" 19 and that the San Francisco
school system was contractually obligated to comply with both title
VI and HEW's regulations, Justice Douglas concluded that the
school system had to comply with the regulations and provide supplemental education or face l:l. cutoff of federal funds.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion also stressed the importance
of HEW's title VI enforcement regulations. After asserting that title
VI alone might not require the termination of federal funding absent
a showing that the school system had discriminated intentionally,20
Justice Stewart stated that the "critical question" was whether
HEW's regulations, which clearly adopted an impact standard and
which required the provision of supplemental education,21 exceeded
the authority granted by title VI. 22 Justice Stewart applied the standard established by previous decisions23 - agency regulations will
be sustained if they are "reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation"24 - and concluded that HEW's regulations
were valid.25
15. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (1973).
17. 414 U.S. at 5~8 (emphasis in original).
18. 414 U.S. at 568 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)).
19. 414 U.S. at 569. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that Congress can
condition the receipt of federal funds on the observance of federal statutory and administrative
directives. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,474 (1980); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
20. 414 U.S. at 569-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1973).
22. 414 U.S. at 571.
23. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
24. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S.
268, 280-8 I (1969)).
25. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The Lau Court's reliance on HEW's impact standard to establish
a statutory violation coupled with the absence of any constitutional
analysis26 suggested that title VI and the equal protection clause27
were independent prohibitions against discrimination. Four years
later, however, the validity of this conclusion was cast into doubt
by the Court's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,28 a case that involved both constitutional and statutory challenges to a medical school's affirmative action admissions program. 29
In Bakke, Justice Powell, writing separately, and Justice Brennan,
joined by three other Justices, held that certain kinds of admissions
programs favoring minorities would pass constitutional muster. 30
Finding evidence in title VI's massive legislative history31 indicating
that Congress meant to prohibit discrimination no more broadly
than does the Constitution itself, these Justices agreed in dicta that
such programs were also permissible under title VI. 32 Since the
Court had previously held that the Constitution prohibits only intentional discrimination,33 some courts have interpreted Bakke as overruling Lau and have required a showing of discriminatory intent in
all title VI litigation.34
This argument is plausible, but three elements of Bakke indicate
that Lau remains viable. First, neither Justice Powell nor Justice
26. The decision's statutory basis obviated the need for any consideration of the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim. See 414 U.S. at 566.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. Plaintiff Alan Bakke alleged that the special admissions program of the University of
California at Davis Medical School violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and§ 601 of title VI. 438 U.S. at 276-78. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld the constitutionality of certain types of affirmative action plans,
while a separate majority composed of Justices Powell, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens,
Stewart, and Rehnquist held that Bakke's constitutional rights had been violated and ordered
his admission to medical school
30. 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.).
31. Title VI was enacted as one part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§§ 101-1106, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-20000h-6 (1976, Supp. II 1978
& Supp. IV 1980). References to title VI are scattered throughout the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act, which occupies hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record, see 110
CONG. REc. Jndex (1964), and includes more than three thousand pages of congressional hearings. See, e.g., Civil Rights - The President's Program, 1963: Hearings Be.fare the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1963); Civil Rights: Hearings Be.fare Suhcomm.
No. 5 ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
32. 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only those
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment."); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) ("Title VI prohibits
only the uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a
State or its agencies . . . .").
33. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
34. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
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Brennan expressed any desire to overrule Lau.35 Although Justice
Brennan acknowledged that the thrust of his argument - that title
VI prohibits discrimination no more broadly than the Constitution
- appeared to contradict the premise of Lau,36 he later cited Lau for
the proposition that HEW's regulations "are entitled to considerable
deference in construing title VI." 37 It was "most significant," Justice
Brennan believed, that these regulations authorized and in some
cases required institutions to adopt affirmative action programs.38
The target of the remedial regulations in Lau was the discriminatory
impact of the school system's conduct; there was no evidence of discriminatory intent. In noting the Lau remedy with approval, Justice
Brennan confirmed that discriminatory impact can suffice to establish a title VI violation. Justice Powell also confronted Lau expressly
but he chose to distinguish rather than overrule it, emphasizing the
absence in Bakke of any "determination by the legislature or a responsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring remedial efforts."39
Second, the Court focused on entirely different issues in Lau and
Bakke. The issue in Lau was whether proof of disparate impact was
sufficient to state a claim under title VI40 In Bakke, however, the
Court had no occasion to consider whether impact alone was actionable under title VI since the medical school had intentionally excluded the plaintiff in favor of minority applicants.41 The Bakke
Court only needed to analyze different kinds of intentional discrimination. Any consideration of de facto discrimination would have
been superfluous.
The Court's attention to the remedial purpose of title VI is a final
element of Bakke that supports Lau's continuing viability. Both Justice Powell and Justice Brennan expressly noted Congress' interest in
remedying past discrimination against minorities.42 The Justices'
35. See 438 U.S. at 303-05 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.).
36. 438 U.S. at 352.
37. 438 U.S. at 343.
38. 438 U.S. at 343. It may seem anomalous to argue that title Vi's enforcement regulations can properly forbid disparate impact and yet permit affirmative action plans. Yet the
same concept has been embraced by the Supreme Court in interpreting title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Title VII, a companion provision to
title VI that prohibits employment discrimination in similar terms, forbids facially neutral
employment practices that have a disparate impact unjustified by business necessity, see
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), but allows private voluntary affirmative
action plans, see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
39. 438 U.S. at 304-05.
40. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text.
41. See 438 U.S. at 289 n.27.
42. See 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
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dicta limiting title VI's prohibition to the constitutional standard was
motivated by their concern that title VI might otherwise be read to
prohibit affirmative action programs. Such a reading of title VI, the
petitioner had warned, ''would tum a charter of liberty into an instrument of exclusion from opportunities central to American life."43
In expressly declining to consider the issue in Board ofEducation
v. Harris,44 the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that Bakke
did not settle the question whether a showing of disparate impact
alone establishes a valid title VI claim.45 The Harris majority observed in dicta that Congress might have intended to establish an
intent standard in title VI, because "[a] violation of title VI may result in a cutoff of all federal funds, and it is likely that Congress
would wish this drastic result only when the discrimination is intentional."46 But title VI incorporates procedural mechanisms designed
to ensure that federal funds are not withdrawn drastically. While a
title VI violation may lead to the cutoff of all federal funding, the
statute provides that the relevant agency must first attempt to secure
voluntary compliance.47 Failing that, the agency must file reports
with the appropriate House and Senate Committees providing thirty
days' notice of its intention to terminate funding. 48 Given these statutory safeguards, it is not clear that narrowing the range of conduct
that title VI proscribes by imposing an intent standard is necessary to
prevent "drastic" funding cutoffs. The Harris Court, moreover, ignored the fact that title VI plaintiffs normally seek to enjoin future
discrimination or reductions in services rather than to force the termination of federal funding. 4 9
In sum, Lau established that title VI regulations incorporating an
impact standard are consistent with the statute. While language in
43. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 6, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), reprinted in 100 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
nm UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (1978).
44. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
45. 440 U.S at 149. Harris involved a challenge to HEW's authority to employ a disparate
impact standard of discrimination under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 20 U.S,C.
§§ 3193-3207 (Supp. II 1978). The Court upheld the validity of a disparate impact standard
under the ESAA and concluded that there was no need to consider whether a showing of
disparate impact would also establish a vio~tion of title VI.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court discussed with approval its hold•
ing in Lau that HEW regulations adopting a disparate impact standard are a constitutional
exercise of Congress' power under the spending clause. 448 U.S. at 479. F11/lllove indicates
that the Court still considers Lau to be good law. It is significant that Justices White and
Powell joined the opinion of the Court, since they were among the five Justices who indicated
in Bak/ce that title VI requires a showing of discriminatory intent.
46. 444 U.S. at 150.
47. 45 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976).
48. 45 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976).
49. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane)
(Adams, J., concurring).
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Bakke may have created doubt, courts should not interpret that decision as an obstacle to enforcing these regulations. Part II more
closely examines the regulations in light of the language, legislative
history, and policy of title VI. It concludes that agency regulations
issued under title VI, as valid legislative rules having the force of
law, bind courts to an impact standard.
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH
Administrative agencies issue two types of rules and regulations.
Interpretative regulations "advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers."50 Legislative regulations "are issued pursuant to statutory authority and
implement the statute; they create law just as the statute itself does,
by changing existing rights and obligations." 51 The difference between these two types of regulations has significant implications for
courts reviewing agency actions. Valid legislative regulations are
binding on courts,52 but interpretative regulations are merely entitled
to deference in varying degrees depending on the facts of the particular case.53
In deciding whether a particular agency regulation is legislative
or interpretative, it is important to recall that "[t]he legislative power
of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of
quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress."54
When Congress delegates its legislative power, the administrative
regulations promulgated by the responsible agency are legislative
rather than interpretative and have "the force and effect of law." 55
Congress delegates substantive law-making authority ~o administra50. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979) (quoting ATrORNEY GENON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 30 n.3 (1947)). The Court noted
that "[i]n prior cases, we have given some weight to the Attorney General's Manual • . . since
the Justice Department was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the Act's
enactment in 1946." 441 U.S. at 302 n.31.
51. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 154 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g.,
Herweg v. Ray, 50 U.S.L.W. 4205, 4207 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 295 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).
52. See authorities cited in note 56 infra.
53. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (''The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control")). See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE§ 7.14 (2d ed. 1979).
54. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
55. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979) (quoting Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977)). See, e.g., Herweg v. Ray, SO U.S.L.W. 4205, 4207 (Feb. 23,
1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 554 F.2d 1140, 1153-54
&nn.24-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 2K. DAVIS,supra note 53, at§ 7.8; B. ScHWARTZ,supra note 51,
ERAL'S MANUAL
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tive agencies via statute.56 Thus courts must scrutinize pertinent
statutory language before characterizing regulations as legislative or
interpretative.
When one applies these principles to title VI, the clarity of Congress' delegation of legislative authority is striking. Section 602 of
title VI provides that "[e]ach Federal department and agency which
is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program
or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions
. . . of this title . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . ."57 Shortly after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was enacted, a presidential task force 58 produced model title VI enforcement regulations specifying, in part, that recipients of federal
funds may not use "criteria or methods of administration which have
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or "the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race,
color, or national origin."59 These regulations were soon adopted by
seven agencies60 and have now been promulgated by at least fiftytwo federal agencies,61 including every Cabinet department. 62 Since
section 602 not only authorizes but commands federal agencies to
issue regulations enforcing title VI's policy of nondiscrimination, the
enforcement regulations are legislative.
The Supreme Court has generally been content to state, without
further explanation, that legislative regulations are those issued pursuant to explicit statutory authority, 63 but language in General Elecat- 148-49; Koch, .Public Procedures far the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General
Statements ofPolicy, 64 GEO. LJ. 1047, 1047-49 & nn.4-10 (1976).
56. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 7.8; authorities cited in note 55 supra; cf. General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S 125, 140-42 (1976) (distinguishing Congress' failure in title VII to
confer rulemaking authority on administrative agency from "regulations which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability").
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976).
58. See Co=ent, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Implementation and Impact,
36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 845-46 (1968).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964) ·(emphasis added).
60. 29 Fed. Reg. 16,273-309 (1964) (Dept of Interior; Dept of Agricul~ure; Dept. of Labor;
Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; General Services Administration; Housing and
Home Finance Agency; and the National Science Foundation).
61. See C.F.R. Index (July l, 1981) at 84-86.
62. Dept. of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1981); Dept. of Energy, 10 C.F.R.
§ 1040.13(c), (d) (1981); Dept of the Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(b)(2), (3) (1981); Dept. of State,
22 C.F.R. § 14I.3(b)(2) (1981); Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R.
§ I.4(2)(i), (3) (1981); Dept of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 42.l04(b)(2), (3) (1980); Dept. ofLabor, 29
C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2), (3) (1981); Dept of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(4) (1981); Dept. of
Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 300.4(b)(2) (1981); Dept of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1980);
Dept of Co=erce, 15 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) (1981); Dept of Health and Human Services, 45
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2), (3) (1980); Dept of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2), (3) (1981).
63. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 54. See authorities cited in note 55 supra.
The relationship between the nature of legislative regulations and their statutory origin
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tric Co. v. Gilhert64 supports the proposition that title VI regulations
are legislative. In Gilbert, the Court held that title VII did not confer
law-making power on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).65 Accordingly, the EEOC's employment discrimination guidelines were interpretative and entitled only to
"consideration."66 The Court cited Section 23(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193467 as an example of a provision that aqthorizes
the promulgation of legislative regulations. Section 23(a) provides
that "[t]he [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall ... have
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter." 68 Section
602, under which federal agencies are "authorized and directed to
effectuate" title VI's provisions,69 is a similar, if not more forceful,
delegation of legislative power. The Court's illustrative reference in
Gilbert, then, provides further support for characterizing title VI regulations as legislative.
The debates on title VI supply even more compelling evidence
that Congress intended to delegate legislative authority to the executive branch. Although Justices Powell's and Brennan's opinions in
Bakke found support for the proposition that Congress intended to
limit title Vi's definition of discrimination to the constitutional standard,70 contrary language can also be found. 71 A review of the masseems self-evident. If the law is to regulate conduct effectively, it must often be composed of
complex and specific rules. Since Congress is not always capable of enacting sufficiently detailed statutory language, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may delegate its
law making authority to the executive branch so long as the separation of powers is preserved.
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-26 (1944); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 3.1; note 95 infra.
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
65. 429 U.S. at 141.
66. 429 U.S. at 141-42.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976). See 429 U.S. at 141.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
10. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
71. Some statements suggest that title VI and the Constitution were not intended to be
coextensive. See, e.g., 110 CoNo. REc. 2467-68 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (''I believe
there is a case in one of the courts of appeal [sic] which has held that 'separate but equal' as
applicable to these hospital grants unconstitutional [sic]. That case has not yet been decided
by the Supreme Court. By the enactment of title VI you override all such 'separate but equal'
provisions for the future, regardless ofthe ultimate outcome ofthepending litigation." (emphasis
added)); id at 6544 (remarks of Senator Humphrey) ("The purpose of title VI is to make sure
that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconstitutional. . • . In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to national policy, and to the moral
sense of the Nation." (emphasis added)).
.
Other remarks by legislators suggest that they thought title VI would incorporate a disparate impact standard. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)
(quoting Presidential message to Congress of June 23, 1963, proposing the Civil Rights Act)
("Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not
be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimi-
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sive legislative record72 reveals a pervasive theme flatly inconsistent
with the Justices' proposition: Congress chose to leave the task of
defining and enforcing title VI's prohibition of discrimination to the
executive branch.73 Both proponents and opponents of title VI understood that the statute allowed the executive branch to exercise
broad discretion in defining what would constitute discrimination.74
Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
for example, recognized that the bill assigned "[g]reat powers" to
agency administrators.75 The extent of these powers was illustrated
most clearly in a colloquy between Senator Ervin and Attorney General Kennedy before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Senator Ervin: So the rules which would have thefarce and effect oflaw
are to be developed .first in the minds of the administrators of the various programs and then written in regulations and orders issued by
them?
Attorney General Kennedy: That is correct, Senator.76

The House Judiciary Committee heard similar testimony.77 The
wide latitude afforded the executive branch was bitterly criticized by
the Act's foes, 78 but since Congress knowingly conferred such latination." (emphasis added)); id. at 1703 (remarks of Rep. Winstead) (''Title VI would authorize
Federal agencies to withhold Federal financial support in connection with any program where
there is racial discrimination in its application." (emphasis added)).
12. See note 31 supra.
13. See Abernathy, supra note 8, at 20-39.
14. As Justice Brennan noted in Bakke, "[T]here was a strong emphasis throughout Congress' consideration of title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable flexibility
in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial discrimination." 438 U.S. at 338-39
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackm.un, JJ.).
15. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. .5 ofthe House ComnL on the Judicial)',
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1520-21 (1963) [hereinafter House Subcomm Hearings].
16. Civil Rights - Tlte President's Program, 1963: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1963) (emphasis added).
11. See House-Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2765-66 (colloquy between Rep. Mathias and Attorney General Kennedy).
18. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2498 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Selden) ("[T]itle VI ..• gives
Federal departments and agencies extending Federal financial assistance practically unlimited
powers to dictate the implementation of any and all Federal programs within the States."); Id.
at 1588 (remarks of Rep. Tuck) ("No one would know the law. It would be what these various
agencies say it is, and the law would vary from agency to agency and from mouth to mouth.");
HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the Minority) ("It will be noted
that the word "discrimination" is nowhere defined in the bill."); Id at 2453 ("Of all the harsh
and unprecedented proposals contained in the bill, this title is the most radical departure ftom
proper governmentalpolicy." (emphasis in original)); 110 CoNG REc. 13,068 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Russell) (''Never has there been a bill before the Senate during my time here that has
been so sweeping in its application or result. The bill leaves the definition of offenses against
the law in the hands of the same officers who would prosecute for alleged violations...•"); Id.
at 5612 (remarks of Sen. Ervin) (''What constitutes unequal or unfair treatment? Section 601
and Section 602 of title VI do not say. They leave the determination of that question to the
executive department or agencies administering each program, without any guideline whatever
to point out what is the congressional intent."); id at 12,320 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (''The
casual reader of title VI may fail to grasp the full portent of its provisions. While the stated
objective of title VI is meritorious, the depth of this title is almost beyond description. It
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tude the agency regulations must be characterized as legislative and
given the force and effect oflaw.79
This characterization of the regulations issued under title VI as
legislative was implicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Lau v.
Nichols. 80 Justice Douglas, who wrote the Court's opinion, assumed
without discussion that title VI authorizes federal agencies to issue
binding regulations. 81 Similarly, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion implied that HEW's enforcement regulations are legislative
when it judged them against th~ lenient standard developed to test
the validity oflegislative regulations.82
The express delegation of authority in title VI, Congress' recognition that the executive branch would exercise substantive authority
under the provision, and the Court's opinion in Lau, therefore, all
confirm that the enforcement regulations are legislative. The impact
standard that they impose is thus binding on courts so long as the
agencies involved validly exercised their delegated power.83
cannot be clearly delineated. It cannot be said that it goes so far and no farther. It has openended provisions that virtually give it whatever depth and intensity a Federal bureaucrat may
read into iL").
19. See authorities cited in note 55 supra.
Two factors help explain Congress' decision to leave the task of defining discrimination to
administrative officials. First, agencies would not be subject to static rules applicable to every
executive department; instead, each agency could, over time, adopt regulations appropriate to
its particular program. See, e.g., Hot/Se Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2765-66 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Ke~edy). Second, Congress was concerned with the "dilly-dallying" of
federal judges in the fight against discrimination and consequently assigned primary enforcement responsibility to agency administrators. See., e.g., id at 1523 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
80. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
81. 414 U.S. at 566.
82. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,295,308 (1979) (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,224 (1943)); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 42526 (1976); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 7.8; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at § 59.
Even if a court should erroneously conclude that the title VI enforcement regulations are
interpretative rather than legislative, the agencies' choice of a disparate impact standard would
still be entitled to a very high degree of judicial deference. "Courts give extra authoritative
weight to interpretative rules . . . which are made contemporaneously with the enactment of
the statute, which have been followed consistently over a long period, or which were outstanding at the time of statutory reenactmenL" 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 64; see, e.g., Saxbe v.
Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); NLRB
v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1973). The title VI enforcement regulations satisfy each of
these conditions. The regulations have not been modified since they were first promulgated in
December, 1964. See 29 Fed. Reg. 16,273-309 (1964). Nor has Congress ever criticized or
questioned these regulations, even though it has amended the statute since its original enactment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976). In addition, the model regulations on which all of
the agency regulations are based were drafted under the aegis of the Justice Department just a
few months after title VI was enacted. The Justice Department's involvement is significant
because it helped draft the language of title VI as well. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra
note 75, at 2703 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Kennedy). An interpretation of a statute by administrators who participated in drafting it is entitled to particularly great weighL See Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
On the other hand, if these regulations are withdrawn, new regulations adopting an intent
standard would be entitled to very little respect since they would contradict a previous, consis-
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The Supreme Court has recognized several related formulations
for testing the validity of legislative regulations. "A reviewing court
is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner." 84 Legislative regulations are invalid only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or if the issuing
agency exceeded its statutory authority. 85 They will be upheld so
long as they are "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation." 86 But regulations that conflict with their statutory
scheme will not be sustained even if they advance the legislation's
goals.87 To assess the validity of the impact regulations promulgated
under title VI, therefore, it is necessary to analyze the language, legislative history, and policies of title VI. 88
Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs,
but it neither defines "discrimination" nor includes any criteria or
standards that would narrow or withhold administrative discretion
to identify the conduct subject to its proscription. 89 The statute
merely commands federal agencies to issue rules and regulations eftent, contemporaneous, and long-standing interpretation. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976).
84. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1976).
85. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1976) (quoting Administrative Procedure
Act § IO(e), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) (1976)).
86. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring); Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S.
268, 280-81 (1969).
87. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979); Note, SEC .Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Allomeys Under Rule 2(e), 79 MICH. L. Rev. 1270, 1281-82 (1981).
88. Legislative regulations must also be properly promulgated. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note
53, at 36. The Administrative Procedure Act (1976) (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), normally requires legislative rules to be published for notice and comment before final adoption.
The title VI regulations are valid, even though many agencies did not publish them prior to
adoption, because the APA exempts from its publication requirement rules and regulations
"relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976). These title VI regulations apply only to the recipients
of federal funds and thus come within this exception. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp., Corvallis v. Mathews, 609 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1979); Housing Auth. v. United States Housing
Auth., 468 F.2d 1, 9 (8$ Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); Opelika Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F.
Supp. 289, 295 (N.D. Ill. 1970), '!lfd. mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51,
at 169-70.
There is also no question as to the regulations' constitutionality. The Supreme Court has
held repeatedly that Congress and the agencies to which it has delegated authority may under
the spending clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl 1, require recipients of federal funds to observe
stricter standards of nondiscrimination than are required by the Constitution. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980); Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 137-38
(1979); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974). The only inquiry, therefore, is statutory.
89. See Regents of the Univ. of Calv. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,284 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("The
concept of 'discrimination' . . • is susceptible of varying interpretations. . • ."); 438 U.S. at
337 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) ("[T]he legislative history [of title VI]
shows that Congress specifically eschewed any static definition of discrimination. • • .").
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_fectuating its policy of nondiscrimination.90
One provision suggests, however, that Congress did not mean to
impose a rigid constitutional definition of discrimination on the
agencies. Congress adopted an amendment, proposed by Representative Lindsay, that required all rules and regulations issued under
title VI to be approved and signed by the President.91 Lindsay, a
leading proponent of the Civil Rights Act,92 explained that agency
rulemaking would be so critical in defining title Vi's reach that "the
Chief Executive should be required to put his stamp of approval on
such rules and regulations." 93 As a procedural requirement imposed
on agencies whose discretion is otherwise unconstrained by statutory
limits, the Lindsay amendment indicates that Congress meant to allow the executive wide latitude in enforcing title VI. It seems doubtful, moreover, that Representative Lindsay would have believed his
amendment necessary had he understood the forthcoming regulations to be restricted to a constitutional standard of discrimination.
Notwithstanding Congress' intent to delegate the difficult task of
defining discrimination to the executive branch,94 there was extensive discussion concerning the uncertain object of title Vi's proscription. The meaning of "discrimination" was a controversial issue.
Opponents of the legislation expressed particular antipathy toward
the possibility that it would be used to attack de facto as well as de
jure discrimination.95 The legislative history reveals that Congress
90. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (1976).
91. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-l (1976).
92. Rep. Lindsay, a member of the Judiciary Committee, was an active participant in the
House debate on title VI. See lIO CONG. REc. 2797 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Conte).
93. 110 CONG. REc. 2499 (1964).
94. Congress was within its constitutional authority when it delegated the task of defining
"discrimination" to the executive branch. The Supreme Court has invalidated Congress' delegation of authority to the executive in only two cases, both decided in 1935. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935). Since then the Court has upheld every challenged delegation, including
several broader than that contained in section 602. See, e.g., American Trucking Assn. v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). A delegation of
authority will be sustained so long as Congress expresses a guiding principle against which
administrative action can be measured. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425
(1944). Title VI and its legislative history explicitly identify the problem which concerned
Congress: unequal treatment of blacks and other minorities in government-funded programs.
Moreover, courts have recently confirmed Congress' power to mandate that agencies define
statutory terms. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981); Batterton
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712,
717 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 797 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Thus,
whatever the current limit, if any, on Congress' power to delegate legislative-type authority to
the executive branch, see generally I K. DAVIS, supra note ?3, at§ 3.1; McGowan, Congress,
Court, and Control of.DelegatedPower, 11 CoLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977); Wright, Book Review,
81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972j, Congress was within its constitutional authority when it delegated the
responsily.lity for defining "discrimination."
95. See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the minority);
Abernathy, supra note 8, at 26-30.
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was aware of the likelihood that the Johnson administration would
use title VI in exactly that way. 96 The Minority Report of the House
Judiciary Committee, for example, bitterly predicted that the administration would act to ~'remove the effects ofprevious practices" in its
quest to attain "racial balance."97 Yet neither the statute nor the
legislative history suggests that Congress meant to preclude this possibility. Indeed, the political controversy over the question may further explain Congress' willingness to charge another branch of
government with responsibility for resolving the issue. Regulations
that include an impact standard for defining discrimination cannot,
therefore, be considered contrary to congressional intent.
Agency adoption of a disparate impact standard is also consistent
with the goals of title VI. As one Congressman observed, "Title VI
enunciates what always should have been the policy of the United
States - that no person should pe denied equal benefits under any
federal financial assistance program because of his race, color, religion or national origin."98 While the proof problems that attend the
application of an intent standard may prevent the full realization of
this goal, the disparate impact standard prohibits both intentional
discrimination and facially neutral practices that have a discriminatory effect. Accordingly, it advances the policy of title VI by ensuring that administrators of federally funded programs are sensitive to
the discriminatory impact of their actions.
In explicitly conferring on the executive branch the authority and
responsibility to issue enforcement rules and regulations under title
VI, Congress gave administrative agencies the power to promulgate
rules with legislative effect. These regulations, which adopt a disparate impact standard of discrimination, are consistent with the text,
legislative history, and policy of the statute.99 Since consistency with
96. See, e.g.,House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 1512, 1519 (testimony of HEW
Secretary Celebrezze).
97. HousE JUDICIARY Rl!roRT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the minority) (emphasis
added).
98. 110 CoNo. REc. 1594 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Farbstein).
99. Congress' adoption in the 1970's of statutes prohibiting discrimination on account of
sex, Education Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)) (prohibiting sex discrimination in certain educational programs),
handicap, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 393 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. m 1979)), or age, Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94135, tit. III,§ 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976)), also supports the view that
title VI was not intended to incorporate a constitutional prohibition of discrimination. The
language of these measures was clearly patterned after that used in title VI, yet it is very
unlikely that Congress intended thereby to incorporate only a constitutional standard of discrimination since the Constitution has been interpreted to afford only minimal. protection
against these forms of discrimination. The better view is that in modeling these statutes after
title VI, Congress ''understood the phraseology and pattern already employed in title VI to
allow agencies to attack discriminatory actions that do not violate judicial conceptions of constitutional equal protection." Abernathy, supra note 8, at 38.
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the enabling statute renders legislative regulations valid, courts must
enforce an impact standard in title VI litigation.
Adoption of a disparate impact standard in title VI suits might
pose practical problems. Minorities could more easily challenge the
decisions of governmental officials since any program with a disparate effect on a protected class would be vulnerable under title VI.
Consequently, courts may be placed in the uncomfortable position of
having to review the day-to-day decisions of administrative arid
political entities. 100
Nevertheless, an appropriate allocation of evidentiary burdens
would ameliorate this problem. Initially, a plaintiffs proof of disparate impact should establish a prima facie title VI violation. 101 The
defendant then should have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's
showing. The defendant's rebuttal should include a showing that a
rational procedure, including consideration of available alternatives,
led to the challenged decision. 102 Two recent title VI cases in the
courts of appeals suggest that any further requirement need not be
onerous. In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 103 the Third Circuit
indicated that a defendant's rebuttal burden was one of production
rather than persuasion. 104 Under this test, producing evidence that
the disparate impact results from the pursuit of a legitimate governmental interest should enable the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case.
·
105
In Bryan v. Koch, the Second Circuit did not clearly enunciate
the nature of the defendant's task once the plaintiffs had established
their prima facie. case, though an earlier decision in the circuit had
imposed a burden of persuasion ·in analogous civil rights litigation.106 The Bryan majority did indicate that title VI defendants
need not account for their failure to choose an alternative to the
challenged decision. 107 Judge Newman's majority opinion expressed
extreme reluctance to intrude on administrative and legislative functions by independently assessing other options. 108 Yet as Judge
Kearse pointed out in a separate opinion, courts may provide mean100. See generally, NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
bane) (Adams, J., concurring); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane);
Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., concurring); cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977) (disparate impact establishes prima facie title VIl case).
102. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., concurring).
103. 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane).
104. 657 F.2d at 1334-36.
105. 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. See Vulcan Socy. of New York City Fire Dept. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 F.2d 387,
393 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. See 627 F.2d at 618-19.
108. See 627 F.2d at 619.
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ingful review without risking 'judicial usurpation of executive prerogatives inherent in any review of the substance of the decision" by
requiring that decisions result from processes that demonstrably include consideration of altematives. 109 An impact standard, therefore, need not hamstring policy makers or present insurmountable
problems of judicial administration.
CONCLUSION

Courts considering suits brought under title VI must use the standard of nondiscrimination specified in the enforcement regulations
issued by the funding agency. In enacting title VI, Congress delegated to the executive branch broad authority to define and enforce
title Vi's prohibition of discrimination. The executive branch has
responded by promulgating regulations that prohibit disparate impact in federally funded programs. These regulations are legislative
in nature and within the scope of the enabling statute. Hence, they
carry the force of law and are binding upon the courts.

109. See 627 F.2d at 623-28 (Kearse, J., dissenting in part).

